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I.

Introduction

“What’s in a name? that which we call a rose// By any other name would smell as sweet.” The
idea that a name is artificial and meaningless seems enchanting with respect to Romeo and Juliet’s
star-crossed romance. However, a name actually has particular force in today’s complicated and
evolving workforce, where courts face the difficult challenge of differentiating employees from
independent contractors. While an employer may label a worker as one thing, it is the job of the
courts to look past the label and ensure a worker is properly classified. The classification of a
worker as an employee or independent contractor has significance for both the worker and the
employer. An employee receives, among other things, statutorily required income and benefits.
That means an employer can avoid substantial costs by labeling a worker as an independent
contractor.

Currently, there is no standardized test that provides guidance to courts for

distinguishing employees from independent contractors.

Rather different agencies and

jurisdictions use different tests. Courts are faced with the challenge of applying the different
factors of varying tests to aspects of a business’s policies and procedures that will definitively
classify a worker as an independent contractor or an employer.
Today, we have emerging new business models in which classification of workers is critical to
the success of the company’s business model, yet poses a challenge because of its non-traditional
nature. California, an employee-friendly state, is considering the classification issue of two rising
on-demand companies, Uber and Lyft. In March, two district court judges in the Northern District
of California denied summary judgment to both companies, leaving the question of whether drivers
were employees or independent contractors to a jury.1 Both courts applied the California right to

1

Cotter v. Lyft, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1069; O’Connor v. Uber Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1135.
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control test for determining if a worker is an employee or independent contractor, which was
developed in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Industrial Relations.2
The Ninth Circuit is no stranger to shaking up the independent contractor business model. In
2014, it ruled in Alexander v. FedEx3 that FedEx drivers were employees, despite the fact that
FedEx labeled them as independent contractors. Alexander applied California’s right to control
test, and found that the underlying employment relationship between FedEx and its drivers was
clear and unambiguous.4 However, the recent Uber and Lyft cases do not provide such an obvious
answer to the classification question. Up to this point, the Borello factors have been applied to an
economic model vastly different from the quickly evolving on-demand economy.5 That means
that, using the same test that determined FedEx drivers were employees, Uber and Lyft drivers
may also be considered employees. As an alternative, this Article considers the possibility that
Uber and Lyft drivers fall into a new category of employment, one that has not been considered
among the traditional work relationships. First, the Article lays out the different tests various
branches of government use to classify workers as employees or independent contractors. Next,
the Article will narrow the scope towards the Ninth Circuit, and outline the history of the
employment misclassification test formed in Borello and applied in Alexander. Then, the Article
will turn towards the employee misclassification cases in California involving Uber and Lyft. It
will contrast the on-demand business models analyzed in these cases with FedEx’s business model.
Finally, the Article will propose a new classification of workers that will make room for emerging
on-demand business models –the square peg between two round holes.

2

769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989).
765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014).
4
Id. at 990.
5
Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081.
3
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II.

The History and Development of Employee Misclassification

A. CLASSIFYING WORKER STATUS
a. Why Do Employers Misclassify?
Under a traditional understanding of employment, employees were “individuals hired on a
permanent or full-time basis or part-time basis with an understanding of continuous employment”6
and independent contractors were “individuals who lack a contract for long term employment and
whose minimum hours may vary at random.”7 However, this traditional understanding has been
complicated because different government agencies and states use different factors and balancing
tests to determine if a worker is an independent contractor or an employee.8 The complications of
the tests cause some employers to misclassify their workers out of genuine error. However, many
employers intentionally misclassify because of the financial benefits they gain from labeling
workers as independent contractors.9 If an employer classifies a worker as an employee, federal
and state laws require employers to pay that employee at least minimum wage and overtime;
refrain from discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and other personal characteristics; maintain
safe and healthy workplaces; contribute toward payroll taxes that go towards the employee’s
unemployment insurance; provide Social Security, Disability Insurance and Medicare; provide
workers’ compensation insurance; and, in many employers cases, provide healthcare. 10 The laws
that afford protections to a worker classified as an employee places an expensive burden on the

6

Karen R. Harned, Georgina M. Kryda & Elizabeth A. Milito, Creating A Workable Legal Standard For Defining
An Independent Contractor, 4, 10 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 93, 95 (2010).
7
Id.
8
Id. at 99.
9
Ruth Burdick, Principles of Agency Permit the NLRB to Consider Additional Factors of Entrepreneurial
Independence and the Relative Dependence of Employees When Determining Independent Contractor Status Under
Section 2(3), 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 75, 76 (1997).
10
Seth D. Harris and Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work:
“The Independent Worker”, in THE HAMILTON PROJECT (2015).
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employer. By changing this business model and classifying workers as independent contractors,
employers can avoid the expenses associated with employee status.
Another benefit employers receive from misclassifying workers as independent contractors
is escaping vicarious liability. Under that theory, an employer is liable, as well as the employee,
for the negligent acts of its employee, as long as the acts were committed in the course and scope
of the employment.11 If an employer retains a worker as an independent contractor, however, the
employer cannot be held responsible.
b. Common Law Test
The common law agency test is used to determine whether an individual is classified as an
employee or an independent contractor for purpose of defining when an employer was vicariously
liable for the tortious acts of its agents.12 Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, these factors
include:
(1) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details
of the work;
(2) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(3) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether in the locality, the work is usually
done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(4) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(5) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the
place of work for the person doing the work;
(6) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(7) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(8) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
(9) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant;
and
(10) whether the principal is or is not in business.13

11

Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742,756 (1998).
Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Rethinking the Worker Classification Test: Employees, Entrepreneurship, and
Empowerment, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 67, 76 (2013).
13
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (2)(a)-(j) (1958). See also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24.
12
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These factors are weighed and balanced against each other. It is not necessary that each factor is
met, and the main focus of the test is whether an employer retains the right to control the manner
and means by which the product is accomplished.14
c. The ABC Test
The “ABC” test is used by many states to determine employer’s obligation for payment of
unemployment taxes.15 To be considered an independent contractor, a worker must meet three
requirements: (a) the worker is free from control or direction in the performance of the work; (b)
the work is done outside the usual course of the company’s business and is done off the premises
of the business; and (c) the worker is customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation,
profession, or business. 16 This test is broad and results in classification for most workers as
employees.17 It creates a presumption of employment, which makes it harder for employers to
escape financial and legal obligations by intentionally misclassifying.18
However, any given individual may be classified as an employee and an independent
contractor at the same time under different common law and statutory regimes. Therefore, workers
who are classified as employees under a state ABC test may be considered independent contractors
for purposes of vicarious liability or under federal statutes. The test’s expansiveness may cause
confusion for both employers and workers who would traditionally be classified as independent
contractors.19
d. The IRS Test

14

Cmty. for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989).
Karen R. Harned, Creating A Workable Legal Standard For Defining An Independent Contractor, 4. J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 93, 102 (2010).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
15
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The Internal Revenue Service created a twenty-factor test to determine whether a worker
is an employee or independent contractor for purposes of withholding taxes.20 An employer is
responsible for withholding income taxes, withholding and paying Social Security and Medicare
taxes, and paying unemployment taxes on wages to employees. Employers do not pay taxes for
independent contractors, which is another incentive to classify workers as such. 21 The IRS
grouped the twenty-factors that determine the degree of control and independence an employer
holds over a worker into three categories: (1) Behavioral:22 Does the company control or have the
right to control what the worker does and how the worker does his or her job?; (2) Financial:23 Are

20

Independent Contractor (Self-Employed) or Employee?, Internal Revenue Service,
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Independent-Contractor-Self-Employed-orEmployee (last updated Aug. 5, 2015).
21
Id.
22
(1) Instructions: If the employer directs where, when, or how work is done, the worker is likely an employee.
This is similar to the right-of-control common law test; (2) Training: If the employer provides training so that the
worker performs in a particular manner and with a particular result, the worker is likely an employee. This is
especially true if the training is provided at regular intervals; (3) Order or sequence: If the employer requires the
worker to perform his tasks in a particular order or sequence, or retains the right to establish a particular order or
sequence, the worker is likely an employee; (4) Assistance: If the employer hires, supervises, and pays assistants to
aid the worker, the worker is likely an employee; (5) Furnishing of tools and materials: If the employer provides the
supplies, materials, equipment, and other tools necessary to perform the work, the worker is an employee dependent
on his employer; (6) Oral or written reports: If the employer requires the worker to submit reports at regular
intervals, the worker is likely an employee; (7) Payment: If the employer pays the worker by salary or by hour,
week, or month, the worker is likely an employee. If the worker is paid when he or she bills for services performed,
or is paid on commission, the worker is likely an independent contractor; (8) Doing work on employer's premises: If
the employer requires the worker to perform his/her services on the premises, where the employer can have control
over the worker, the worker is likely an employee; (9) Set hours of work: If the employer requires the worker to
perform a set number of work hours, sets the worker's schedule, or retains approval rights over the worker's
schedule, the worker is likely an employee. If the employer does not approve the worker's schedule, the worker is
likely an independent contractor.; (10) Full time required: If the employer requires the worker to work on a full-time
basis, the worker is likely an employee.; (11) Working for more than one firm at a time: If the employer does not
allow the worker to perform work for another firm so long as it is performing work for the employer's firm, the
worker is likely an employee. However, a worker can be an employee of multiple firms at the same time. (12)
Making services available to the public: If the employer does not allow the worker to perform his work for the
public as a free service, the worker is likely an employee.
23
(13) Significant monetary investment: If the worker must make a significant monetary investment in order to
perform his services, he is independent of the employer and is not an employee. There is no set dollar limit that
qualifies as a "significant investment”; it is determined on a case-by-case basis.; (14) Payment of business and/or
traveling expenses: If the worker must expend money for business or business-related travel, and the employer pays
these expenses, the worker is likely an employee. In this case, the employer generally has the ability to control the
extent of the employee's business or travel expenses.; (15) Realization of profit or loss: If the worker does not have
the opportunity to profit (or loss) from his work, he is an employee. The employer is in the capacity of receiving the
money directly from the client and has the opportunity for profit or loss.
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the business aspects of the worker’s job controlled by the payer?; and (3) Type of Relationship:24
Are there written contracts or employee type benefits? Will the relationship continue and is the
work performed a key aspect of the business?25 The IRS asserts that no single factor is dispositive
of classification, and that businesses must weigh all the factors in relation to the relationship.
e. Economic Realities Test
Courts use the economic reality test to determine coverage and compliance with the
minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 26 The economic
reality test, like the common law right to control test, takes into account the degree of control an
employer has over his or her employee, but it also considers the degree to which the workers are
economically dependent on the business.27 Under the economic reality test, courts look at six
factors: “(1) the degree of control exerted by the alleged employer over the worker; (2) the worker's
opportunity for profit or loss; (3) the worker's investment in the business; (4) the permanence of
the working relationship; (5) the degree of skill required to perform the work; and (6) the extent to
which the work is an integral part of the alleged employer's business.”28 The court must look at
the totality of the circumstances rather than one single factor.29
B. A NEW ERA OF OF EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION CASES

24

(16) Services rendered personally: If the worker must perform the work personally, and cannot delegate the tasks,
he/she is an employee; (17) Integration: If the employer uses the worker as part of the course of normal business
operations, the worker is likely an employee. In this case, the success of the business may be directly related to the
success of the individual employee; (18) Continuing relationship: If the employer and the worker have a
longstanding, continuing relationship, the worker is likely an employee. This includes work that is done at recurring
intervals or services performed by a worker who is "on call."; (19) Right to discharge: If the employer may fire or
dismiss the worker, the worker is likely an employee.; (20) Right to terminate: If the worker can terminate the work
relationship and not be liable for completion of a particular job or service, the worker is likely an employee. If the
worker remains liable for a job or service, he or she is an independent contractor. 24
25
Pivateau, at 85-88.
26
See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
27
See Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1998).
28
Id.
29
See Id.
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a. Shift to an “On Demand Economy”
A few years ago no one knew about Uber30 or Lyft31 and few could imagine technology that
would allow individuals to ride in a stranger’s personal vehicle. Now, these platforms have
become well-recognized businesses connecting people with fast and cheap transportation. Uber
and Lyft’s business models revolve around smart-phone apps that connect drivers offering rides to
passengers who seek them.32 The passengers pay a mileage-based fee through credit cards that the
companies keep on file.33 Uber and Lyft take a percentage of the fee and give the rest to the
drivers.34 These type of business models have given rise to the “on demand economy,” which is
“the economic activity created by technology companies that fulfill consumer demand via the
immediate provisioning of goods and services.” 35 The theory behind this business model is that
access to goods and skills is more important than ownership of them.36 An entire economy is being
formed around the exchange of goods and services between individuals instead of directly from
business to consumer.37 “This new class of on-demand companies relies on a large freelance

“Uber Technologies, Inc. provides a smartphone application that connects drivers with people who need a ride.
The company’s application enables users to arrange and schedule transportation and/or logistics services with third
party providers. Uber Technologies services customers in North, Central, and South Americas, as well as Europe,
the Middle East, Africa and the Asia Pacific. . . . [T]he company was founded in 2009 and based in San Francisco,
California.” Company Overview of Uber Technologies, Inc., BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (October 24, 2015, 12:12 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=144524848.
31
“Lyft Inc. helps commuters to share rides with friends, classmates, and coworkers going the same way. It helps
organizations to establish private and social networks for ridesharing. The company focuses on college, university,
and corporate communities. . . . [T]he company was founded in 2007 and is based in San Francisco, California. Lyft
Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Enterprise Holdings, Inc.” Company Overview of Lyft Inc., BLOOMBERG BUSINESS
(October 24, 2015 12:43 PM)
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=58995029.
32
Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U CHI L REV DIALOGUE 86 (2015).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Mike Jaconi, The ‘On-Demand Economy’ Is Revolutionizing Consumer Behavior-Here’s How, Jul. 13, 2014
Business Insider.
36
Danielle Sacks, The Sharing Economy, Fast Company (Apr. 18 2011),
http://www.fastcompany.com/1747551/sharing-economy.
37
Irving Wladawasky-Berger, The Continuing Evolution of the On-Demand Economy, THE CIO REPORT (July 24,
2015 12:25 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/07/24/the-continuing-evolution-of-the-on-demand-economy/.
30
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workforce instead of on a classic company workforce.” 38 Companies in the on-demand economy
hire workers to perform the services the companies offer and the individuals receive. The ondemand economy is breaking down the traditional employment structure in favor of jobs that more
are flexible and temporary.
Uber and Lyft are ride-share companies that have broken ground in the on-demand economy
through their widely used smartphone apps that connect passengers to drivers for hire.39 All hiring
and payment goes through the app, rather than the driver.40 The passengers input their location
and destination, and the app informs the customer when the driver has arrived.41 The app shows
customers the route the driver takes, the estimated time of arrival, and the identity of the driver. 42
After the transaction is completed, the passenger rates the driver.43 Central to Uber and Lyft’s
business model is the classification of drivers as independent contractors, and itself as a
technological platform to connect those drivers with passengers.
b. A New Dilemma
Recently, two separate decisions in California district courts on wage and hour suits
brought by drivers for Uber and Lyft have shaken the independent contractor business model the
ride-sharing companies rely on. Two judges denied summary judgment to Uber44 and Lyft45 to
declare the drivers independent contractors, and instead established a rebuttable presumption that

38

Id.
Thomas Robinson, Could Employee Classification Issues Uberwhelm the Uber Business Model?, THE
WORKCOMP WRITER (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.workcompwriter.com/could-employee-classification-issuesuberwhelm-the-uber-business-model/.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
See O’Connor 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133.
45
See Cotter 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067.
39
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the drivers were employees because they performed services for the company’s benefit.46 Both
judges found that material facts remain disputed, and in light of this, the on-demand car services
will need to make their case to juries as to why their drivers should not be classified as employees
instead of independent contractors under the California Labor Code.47
In both cases, the courts relied on the right to control test adopted in the California Supreme
Court case S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations.48 In addition, both
courts relied on a Ninth Circuit wage and hour case, Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., in
which FedEx drivers alleged that FedEx had misclassified its drivers as independent contractors,
thus entitling the drivers to unpaid wages and expenses.49 The court found that the California
FedEx drivers were misclassified as independent contractors under the California right to control
test.50 The Alexander decision seems to be a catalyst for lawsuits against emerging on-demand
companies, such as Uber and Lyft, which similarly rely on independent contractors for the success
of their business. However, Uber and Lyft’s relationship with its drivers is far more complicated
and inconclusive than FedEx’s.
c. California’s Employee Friendly Laws
California law provides employees with many benefits and protections, while independent
contractors are afforded almost none:51
Employees are generally entitled to, among other things, minimum wage and overtime pay,
meal and rest breaks, reimbursement for work-related expenses, workers’ compensation,
and employer contributions to unemployment insurance. Employers are also required

46

See O’Connor 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133; see also Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067.
Id.
48
769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989).
49
765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014).
50
Id.
51
Cotter 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1074.
47
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under California Unemployment Insurance Code to withhold and remit to the state their
employees’ state income tax payments.52

California provides employees with these protections to ensure that employers do not take
advantage of employees due to the inequality in bargaining power. 53 In essence, these laws
balance the scales and provide employees with more contractual leverage.

The California

legislature does not provide the same protections to independent contractors because their
independent status presumably affords them more bargaining power against companies. 54
Independent contractors can “take their services and equipment elsewhere when faced with unfair
or arbitrary treatment, or unfavorable working conditions.”55 Further, they often are working for
more than one company at a time, and therefore are not “dependent on a single employer in the
same all-or-nothing fashion as traditional employees who tend to work on a full-time basis for an
indefinite term.”56 Past decisions in California have demonstrated that the statutory provisions
aimed at employees should be liberally construed in favor of protecting the employees and
implementing the legislature’s intent.57
d. Borello Decision
In Borello, the California Supreme Court examined whether agricultural laborers engaged
to harvest cucumbers under a written “sharefarmer” agreement were independent contractors
exempt from workers’ compensation coverage under the California Labor Code. 58 The deputy
labor commissioner issued a stop order against a grower, S.G. Borello & Sons, for failure to secure

52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1075.
Borello, 769 P.2d at 400.
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worker’s compensation coverage for laborers.59 The grower argued that the workers were seasonal
agricultural laborers that harvested cucumbers worked under a sharefarmer agreement, meaning
they were tenant farmers who received a share of the profits. 60 Therefore, the grower argued, the
farmers were only seasonal, temporary workers, and should be considered independent
contractors.61
Following the common law vicarious liability tradition, the court held that, “[t]he principal
test of an employment relationship is whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right
to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired.” 62 The court noted that the
factor of control is often inapplicable to a variety of employment relationships when applied in
isolation.63 Therefore, the court concluded that, although the right to control work details is the
most important consideration, there are other “secondary” factors to consider. 64 The court
identified the right to discharge at will, without cause, as strong evidence in support of an
employment relationship.65 Further, the court identified additional factors: (1) whether the one
performing the services is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (2) the kind of occupation,
with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
principal or by a specialist without supervision; (3) The skill required in the particular occupation;
(4) Whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work
for the person doing the work; (5) The length of time for which the services are to be performed;
(6) The method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (7) Whether or not the work is a

59

Id. at 401.
Id. at 402.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 404.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
It should be noted that this factor is unique to California’s right to control test.
60

12

part of the regular business of the principal; and (8) Whether or not the parties believe they are
creating the relationship of the employer-employee.

66

The court viewed these factors not as

separate tests, but as interrelated.67
Ultimately, the court held that the share-farmers were employees and were entitled to
compensation coverage.68 The grower argued that the share-farmers managed their own labor,
shared in the profit or loss, performed a job that requires specific skill and judgment, and signed
an agreement in which they expressly agreed that the parties’ relationship was principalindependent contractor.69 However, the court found that the grower exercised “pervasive control
over the operation as a whole.”70 The grower owned and cultivated the land for his own account,
made the decision to grow cucumbers, supplied the materials and transportation, and controlled
worker’s documentation for production and payment.71 The court held that, “[a] business entity
may not avoid its statutory obligations by carving up its production process into minute steps, then
asserting that it lacks control over the exact means by which one such step is performed by the
responsible workers.”72 Under the test the court had adopted, the grower maintained all necessary
control over the process.73
e. Alexander Decision
The Ninth Circuit reversed a ruling by Multidistrict Litigation Court, which granted
summary judgment in favor of FedEx in a class action alleging that FedEx drivers in California

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id.
Id.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 407-10.
Id. at 408.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 401.
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were employees rather than independent contractors.74 Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that the
amount of control FedEx exhibited over its drivers weighed in favor of finding an employment
relationship.75 The court applied the right to control test adopted in Borello.76 The Ninth Circuit
found that “FedEx’s policies and procedures unambiguously allow FedEx to exercise a great deal
of control over the manner in which its drivers do their jobs.”77 FedEx maintained control through
its detailed appearance requirements for the drivers and their vehicles.78 FedEx also controlled the
time its drivers can work by adjusting workloads so that they forced to work nine and a half to
eleven hours a day.79 The court found that FedEx also controlled how and when drivers delivered
packages.80 It rejected FedEx’s argument that there were details of the driver’s work it did not
control, and that it controls results of the work alone.81 The court noted that absolute control is
not necessary for workers to be considered employees under the right to control test.82
The court found that the secondary factors of the right to control test did not sufficiently
favor FedEx to permit it to classify its drivers as independent contractors.83 The right to terminate
at will is strong evidence of employee status. 84 FedEx’s operating agreement contained an
arbitration clause, which slightly weighed in Fed-Ex’s favor. 85 The provision of tools and
equipment also slightly favored FedEx.86 However, the court found that, even though plaintiffs

74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Alexander 765 F.3d at 983.
Id. at 997.
769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989).
Alexander 765 F.3d at 990.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 994.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 995.
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provided their own trucks and were not required to get equipment from FedEx, the majority of
them did so.87 The final factor that favored FedEx was the parties’ agreement that they were
creating an independent contractor relationship. 88

The operating agreement identifies the

relationship as an independent contractor; however the court found that this was not dispositive or
controlling if, as a matter of law, a different type of employment relationship exists.89 “What
matters is what the contract, in actual effect, allows or requires.” 90 After examining FedEx’s
policies and procedures, the court concluded that the drivers were employees, rather than
independent contractors.91
In this holding, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the “entrepreneurial test” that had been
adapted by the District of Columbia Circuit for classifying employment status. 92 Under the
entrepreneurial test, the emphasis is shifted away from control, and the primary factor is whether
the worker has significant opportunity for gain or loss.93 FedEx relied on the D.C. Circuit decision
to argue that the drivers had the opportunity under the Operating Agreement to delegate to other
drivers, take on additional routes, or sell routes to third parties.94 However, the court held that
these entrepreneurial opportunities FedEx provides drivers are limited because, for example,
FedEx may refuse to let a driver take on additional routes or sell his route.95 The court held that,
regardless, the entrepreneurial test had no application to the case: “There is no indication that

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Id.
Id. at 996.
Id.
Id. at 989.
Id. at 997.
Id. at 993-94.
FedEx Home Delivery v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Alexander 765 F.3d at 994.
Id.
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California has replaced its longstanding right-to-control test with the new entrepreneurialopportunities test developed by the D.C. Circuit.”96
III.

New Business Model, Same Old Test

The California right to control test, when applied to the facts in Alexander, led the court to the
conclusion that the workers were employees. Though FedEx contracted with the drivers as
independent contractors, most aspects of FedEx’s relationship with its drivers looked like a
traditional employer/ employee relationship. However, worker relationships in emerging business
models, such as Uber and Lyft, do not so neatly fit into the traditional independent contractoremployee dichotomy. The Borello test has consistently been applied to result in either independent
contractor or employee status. In Cotter and O’Connor, both judges recognize a new, unclassified
relationship between worker and company.
A. WHAT IS CONTROL: DISPARITIES BETWEEN ALEXANDER AND EMERGING ONDEMAND CASES
The court in Cotter examined whether Lyft drivers should be considered employees or
independent contractors under California law. 97 The court denied cross-motions for summary
judgment, and found that the issue presented a mixed question of law and fact that should be
resolved by a jury.98 The court in O’Connor reviewed a similar matter involving the classification
of Uber drivers.99 The court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment, leaving a jury to
resolve the matter. 100 In Alexander, even though FedEx cloaked its drivers as independent
contractors, the Ninth Circuit found that FedEx drivers were employees as a matter of law because
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“the arrow pointed so strongly in the direction of one status or another that no reasonable juror
could have pointed the arrow in an opposite direction after applying California’s multi-factor
test.”101 The courts in both ride-share cases acknowledged that the Borello right to control test
does not produce such a conclusive result when applied to Uber and Lyft drivers. The court in
O’Connor noted that “numerous factors point in opposing directions.” 102 The court in Cotter
recognized that “[a]t first glance, Lyft drivers don’t seem much like employees. . . But Lyft drivers
don’t seem much like independent contractors either.”103
In Cotter, the parties disagreed about the amount of control Lyft exercises over its drivers.
The court acknowledged that Lyft maintains a good deal of control over how drivers proceed after
they accept ride requests.104 Lyft provides a driver with instructions on what not to do on the
job. 105 Also, Lyft reserves the right to penalize or terminate drivers who violate company
policy.106 Lyft maintains quality control over its drivers through a rating system, and any driver
who falls below a certain threshold is subject to termination.107 However, the court also recognized
that the Lyft driver “enjoys great flexibility in when and how often to work–far more flexibility
than the typical employee.”108 The court noted that there were no undisputed facts that provided
overwhelming evidence of an employment relationship, as in Alexander. 109 The court further
pointed out, “the experience of the Lyft driver is much different from the experience of the FedEx
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driver, underscoring why the plaintiffs have not established here that summary judgment should
be granted in their favor.”110
In O’Connor, the court recognized that many factors of control were disputed and
ambiguous in Uber’s relationship with its drivers.111 First, the court pointed out that whether a
driver can be terminated at will was in dispute.112 Plaintiffs claimed that Uber might fire drivers
at any time for any reason, which would be strong evidence of an employment relationship.113
However, Uber pointed out that before it terminates drivers it must give notice or there must be a
material breach.114 Uber uses a customer rating system as a form of quality control, similar to
Lyft.115 The court pointed to evidence that, if a driver’s star rating falls below the minimum star
rating, Uber terminates the driver.116 The court noted that the customer rating system is a form of
control used by Uber to “constantly monitor certain aspects of a driver’s behavior,” and that a jury
could find it weighs in favor of finding an employment relationship.117 The court noted that the
fact that Uber has no control over its drivers’ hours and when they report for work significantly
weighs in favor of independent contractor status.118 However, the court pointed out that the more
relevant inquiry is how much control Uber exerts when drivers actually do report for work. 119 The
court in O’Connor noted that there were many factors of the Borello test that pointed in different

110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id.
O’Connor, 82. F. Supp. 3d at 1153.
Id. at 1149.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1151.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1152.
Id.

18

directions, including those involving Uber’s level of control over the manner and means of
performance.120
B. WHY TRADITIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS UNDER BORELLO DO NOT WORK FOR
UBER AND LYFT
The courts in O’Connor and Cotter were faced with the task of applying traditional
common law principles encompassed in the Borello right to control test, to technological platforms
that operate from a smartphone. The independent contractor model of the emerging on-demand
companies becomes the “Wild West” of classification: “The test the California courts have
developed over the 20th Century for classifying workers isn’t very helpful in addressing this 21st
Century problem. Some factors point in one direction, some point in the other, and some are
ambiguous.” 121 It is true that the factors of the Borello test can sometimes produce different
outcomes when applied to many old economy jobs, depending on how a court interprets the facts
of the case or weighs a specific factor. However, the business models of Uber and Lyft do not
look anything like old economy jobs. From an economic and societal perspective, the technology
Uber and Lyft provide creates exciting and new opportunities for workers. It seems critical to
tread through the legal uncertainty and define the employment relationship between Uber/Lyft and
driver.
The core test of an employment relationship under the Borello test is “whether the person
to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the
result desired.”122 The court in O’Connor recognized, the Borello test “evolved under an economic
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model very different from the new sharing economy.”123 Companies employed workers to provide
services for the companies’ own benefit. There was a traditional and more direct connection
between worker and business. Whether an individual was an independent contractor or employee
depended on how much control that business had over that worker. However, the Uber and Lyft
business models diverge from the traditional forms of employment and present challenges to the
application of the Borello test.
The relationships Uber and Lyft maintain with its drivers do not neatly result in
classification under the Borello test. Like an independent contractor, drivers are given freedom to
work for different employers; they are not economically dependent on the ride-share services for
their main source of income. The drivers have flexibility in their work hours and where they work.
The drivers use their own cars for each ride. Drivers also control acceptance of rides, and therefore
are in control of their own opportunity for profit or loss. Contrastingly, like traditional employees,
the drivers are integral to the companies’ businesses. Uber and Lyft maintain control over pricing
of rides and payment. They maintain control through rating systems. However, the form of control
the courts in both cases focused heavily on, the rating system, differs from that of the traditional
business model of a company like FedEx because it does not seek to control every aspect of the
worker’s performance. Rather, it is a form of quality control based on customer feedback. Uber
and Lyft seek to continue or discontinue the engagement based on whether customers are satisfied.
The on-demand companies rely on customer feedback to ensure quality performance. Under this
system, the individuals receiving the service-those being transported- have the ability to rate and
provide feedback. Once Uber or Lyft receive this feedback, the company responds accordingly to
maintain quality control over its business.
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Uber and Lyft provide workers flexibility and freedom in some important aspects of the
work relationship yet maintain control in others. This relationship falls into a gray area of
employment classification.
C. CREATING A NEW CLASSIFICATION: A HYBRID EMPLOYEE AND
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
The court in Cotter correctly stated that “the jury in this case will be handed a square peg and
asked to choose between two round holes.”124 Nearly all workers in the United States fall into one
of two categories: employee or independent contractor. However, these categories seem outdated
and ill fit with the technological age of on-demand businesses run through apps. In these
businesses, where workers seem to cross the border of independent contractor and employee, a
third category seems necessary. For example, courts and labor and employment statutes in Canada
and Germany recognize an intermediate class, the “dependent contractor.”125 This relationship
forms when a contractor has formed an exclusive relationship (80% is the equivalent of exclusive
for Canada) over a period of time with one client, and the client therefore becomes economically
dependent on the relationship.126 While this new worker status that has developed demonstrates
the workability of new categories of work relationships, it does not precisely illustrate the flexible
relationships of the on-demand economy, where employees make a living working for different
companies and sometimes even at the same time.127
Seth Harris, a professor at Cornell University, and Alan Krueger a professor at Princeton
University, have proposed legal reform that could provide a possible solution to the ambiguous
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classification of Uber and Lyft drivers.128 Harris and Krueger propose a new classification of
workers, the independent worker, who “occupy a middle ground between traditional employees
and independent contractors.”129 In an effort to define this new class, Harris and Krueger suggest
ideas of what protections and benefits these new workers would be provided. First, Harris and
Krueger argue that independent workers should be given the freedom to organize and collectively
bargain.130 They contend that these workers should have the ability to bargain over the equivalent
of wages, hours, and the terms and conditions of their contractual relationships.131 Harris and
Krueger point out that the main challenge to independent workers organizing is the federal antitrust law.132 They suggest an independent workers exemption to anti-trust laws, which would
allow the workers to have a voice and some ability to influence their relationship.133
Harris and Krueger also advance that independent workers should be included within the
protections of federal anti-discrimination statutes. 134

Providing independent workers with

protections against discrimination could encourage better policy enforcement by Uber and Lyft
against racial and sexual discrimination.135 Uber would have to administer a new policy that not
only takes into account the rating system of customers, who may discriminate against drivers cause
driver terminations, but possibly also co-worker perception.
Harris and Krueger also suggest allowing intermediary companies, such as Uber and Lyft, to
opt-in to workers’ compensation without transforming the relationship to employment. 136
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However, Uber and Lyft might be better off including workers’ compensation into their business
model. Drivers would have a reasonably predictable compensation for work related injuries, and
Uber and Lyft could avoid costly lawsuits.137
These changes suggested by Harris and Krueger would help to protect every Uber and Lyft
drivers; however other protections they address may be better aimed at drivers who work for the
company in a more full-time capacity. For example, Harris and Krueger assert that independent
workers should not be eligible for wage and hour protections, such as minimum wage, because it
is too hard to measure to hours of a flexible, independent worker compared to a traditional
employee.138 While it is true that Uber and Lyft drivers work flexible, somewhat unpredictable
hours, every hour they work is clocked in and out through the app. A better solution might be for
Uber to pay minimum wage to drivers who work over thirty hours per week. Uber pays drivers
on a weekly basis and uses the app to create a payment summary that shows the breakdown of all
rides. It would be easy to calculate hours and pay drivers minimum wage just by requiring drivers
to hit a thirty hour or more limit, and then referring to the app to see when that driver worked.
Another option might be to allow customers to tip Uber and Lyft drivers.139 The U.S.
Department of Labor does not require employers to pay minimum wage to a worker if the amount
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paid plus tips received equals at least the federal minimum wage. 140 Currently, Uber’s website
discourages riders from tipping drivers.141 Lyft’s website provides instructions of how to tip a
driver, but the reputation surrounding these platforms is that once the ride is over, the fare
automatically charged is the final cost.142 If both Uber and Lyft promoted tipping drivers, this may
change how riders view the experience. Then, Uber and Lyft could avoid paying full minimum
wage to drivers who make it in tips and only make up the difference in those who do not.
Similarly, health insurance could be distributed to drivers who reach the thirty-hour
requirement. However, this presents a problem with maintaining neutrality of independent
workers between the employer/ independent contractor classifications. Under the Affordable Care
Act, employers must provide health insurance to employees who work thirty hours or more.143
Instead, Harris and Krueger propose that intermediary companies pay a contribution equal to five
percent out of independent workers’ earnings to go towards health insurance tax subsidies.144
A new classification for the on-demand workforce could clear up ambiguities for courts that
have previously attempted to pigeon hole these workers into the employee/independent contractor
category. However, it is a lengthy conversation and one that would take years before it is
implemented. The courts cannot create this new category of workers on their own, and therefore
it will be left to the legislatures to provide a workable solution. In the meantime, the ongoing
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lawsuits within the Ninth Circuit probably will not force Uber and Lyft to change their business
model. Uber and Lyft are entirely constructed around its flexible drivers and independent
contractor model. The cases, as of now, are limited to California drivers. These drivers are up
against almost $50 billion companies, so any damages they win will matter little in the general
scheme of things. However, if the lawsuits spread, legislatures, Uber and Lyft will need to consider
a new solution.
Uber and Lyft could potentially change their business model to make the drivers employees.
However, if the drivers were to become employees they would not benefit from the flexibility that
attracts many of them to the ride-share companies in the first place.145 As it stands, Uber and Lyft
drivers have control over when and how often they work. They are free to work other full-time
jobs and still drive for Uber whenever the opportunity arises. 146 As employees, the employer
would control their schedules. 147 The freedom to drive whenever and how frequently it is
convenient for the driver would be lost.148 Drivers who treat the job as a full-time job would benefit
from this, but the many other drivers who do not would suffer.149 Uber would likely compensate
for rising labor costs by taking a larger cut in fares and decreasing its workforce.150 As we address
possible solutions to the on-demand dichotomy and ways to better protect worker interests, we
must keep in mind that many workers are interested in preserving the flexibility and freedom that
first attracted them to Uber and Lyft.
IV.

Conclusion
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The recent Uber and Lyft cases provide insight into the outdated employment classification
test in California in light of the changing economy. However, on a broader scale it raises issues
about what benefits and protections workers are entitled to when they are not an employee or
independent contractor, but something in between. Ultimately, creating a new category of workers
could strengthen the on-demand workforce and clear ambiguity among courts that have wrestled
with these employment relationships.
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